Automated Decision Making and Machine Learning: Regulatory Alternatives for Autonomous Settings by Heminger, Alyssa
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
University Honors Theses University Honors College 
6-16-2021 
Automated Decision Making and Machine Learning: 
Regulatory Alternatives for Autonomous Settings 
Alyssa Heminger 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/honorstheses 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Internet Law 
Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Political Theory Commons, Privacy Law Commons, Public 
Administration Commons, Social Justice Commons, and the Social Policy Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Heminger, Alyssa, "Automated Decision Making and Machine Learning: Regulatory Alternatives for 
Autonomous Settings" (2021). University Honors Theses. Paper 1115. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/honors.1142 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors 












An undergraduate honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the degree of 




Political Science and Community Development 
 
Thesis Advisor 
Dr. Christopher Shortell 
 
 
Portland State University 
2021 
 2 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...…….. 
II. Artificial Intelligence: automated decision-making and machine learning…………………. 
III. Normative concerns and current policy issues……………………………………………… 
IV. Toward a greater regulatory approach………………………………………………………. 
i. Risk-based assessment and cost-benefit analysis………………………………….. 




















Given growing investment capital in research and development, accompanied by extensive 
literature on the subject by researchers in nearly every domain from civil engineering to legal 
studies, automated decision-support systems (ADM) are likely to see a place in the foreseeable 
future. Artificial intelligence (AI), as an automated system, can be defined as broad range of 
computerized tasks designed to replicate human neural networks, store and organize large 
quantities of information, detect patterns, and make predictions with increasing accuracy and 
reliability. By itself, artificial intelligence is not quite science-fiction tropes (i.e. an 
uncontrollable existential threat to humanity) yet not without real-world implications. The fears 
that come from machines operating autonomously are justified in many ways given their ability 
to worsen existing inequalities, collapse financial markets (the 2010 “flash crash”), erode trust in 
societal institutions, and pose threats to physical safety. Still, even when applied in complex 
social environments, the political and legal mechanisms for dealing with the risks and harms that 
are likely to arise from artificial intelligence are not obsolete. As this paper seeks to demonstrate, 
other Information Age technologies have introduced comparable issues. However, the dominant 
market-based approach to regulation is insufficient in dealing with issues related to artificial 
intelligence because of the unique risks they pose to civil liberties and human rights. Assuming 
the government has a role in protecting values and ensuring societal well-being, in this paper, I 
work toward an alternative regulatory approach that focuses on regulating the commercial side of 





I. Introduction  
For all its promises, artificial intelligence has a major issue: algorithmic bias. In 1997, 
Amazon’s hiring engine was found to penalize words such as ‘women’s chess club captain’ and 
downgraded applicants who indicated they attended all women’s colleges (Dastin, 2018). 
Though the algorithm was subsequently abandoned, there is nothing that bars companies from 
employing similar applicant-tracking systems in the future. Similarly, a ProPublica investigation 
of “risk assessment” scores used by judges to predict recidivism rates among offenders, using 
social determinants such as race and class, found that the algorithm was prejudiced against Black 
people (Angwin, Larson, Kirchner, and Mattu, 2016). In each instance, automated decision-
making and machine learning techniques assisted in the decision-making process. Each system 
was given a massive amount of data to quickly sift through, sort, and recognize patterns that 
would be otherwise unrecognizable by a human. Still, the emerging pattern shows that something 
went gravely wrong. Identifying whether it was human error during the data “cleaning” process, 
an unrepresentative dataset, or the implicit biases of the software developer reflected in the 
algorithm, getting to the root of the issue proves particularly challenging given artificial 
intelligence, as a machine learning system, involves a process that is not well-understood even 
by technical experts. 
Since the late 1950s, concurrent to the rise of other ‘Information Age’ technologies, research 
and development in artificial networks has seen many ‘winters’ and ‘springs.’ Beginning in the 
early 1970s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the United States’ Department 
of Defense awarded contracts to develop a system of distributed networks that shared data in 
real-time. The project, spearheaded by Eisenhower in response to the Soviet launching of 
Sputnik, became what is known today as the internet (Gabriel, 2020). The Telecommunications 
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Act of 1996, subsequently passed by the Clinton Administration, revolutionized communication 
networks by increasing competition in the broadband market, making the internet cheaper and 
more widely accessible to users across the nation (Ehrlich, 2014). Today, internet users have the 
advantage of a global network enabling them to be in multiple ‘places’ at once. However, not 
unlike most disruptive technologies, several legal and ethical concerns were raised. For example, 
how does a nation prosecute a crime that happened across borders? In 1994, several hackers, 
located in multiple continents, hacked into the cash management system of a major U.S. bank 
funneling $10 million in their personal bank accounts (“A Byte Out of History, $10 Million 
Hack”, 2014). Issues such as these raised basic questions related to jurisdiction and governance 
prompting a panoply of scholarship by legal academics during the 1990s. Alongside jurisdiction 
and governance, a host of other challenges were also raised related to concepts such as privacy, 
security, and intellectual property. The result were laws on copyright infringement, privacy, and 
hate speech (“Development of the Internet and the World Wide Web,” 1999). 
Comparable to the rise of the Internet, artificial intelligence was spearheaded by government-
sponsored defense programs and privately-funded research projects at large universities and 
companies (“Development of the Internet and the World Wide Web,” 1999). Research into 
artificial intelligence began in the 1960s but it was not until the 21st century, when required 
processing power and availability of datasets and labor became available that investment in 
artificial intelligence as a serious commercial interest boomed. Total global capital investment in 
artificial intelligence is estimated to be $69.6 billion and growing (Zhang et al., 2021). 
Advancements in automated decision-making, machine learning, and predictive analysis have 
streamlined the way industries and various institutions conduct their internal operations and 
public affairs, further embedding technology into the minds of technologists, researchers, 
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politicians, scientists, and the public. More and more, businesses are realizing the supply-side 
advantages of automated decision making, saving both time and money as daily operational 
efficiency improves. For example, mortgage lenders use decision-support systems to approve 
prequalified customers for loans in a matter of minutes (Townson, 2020). Still, the scales by 
which predictive analysis and machine learning are utilized in everyday operations is 
contextually dependent on the goals of an organization, availability of necessary infrastructure, 
data and algorithms, and the pace of technological development (Feldstein, 2019).  
Admittedly, this is an extremely simplified version of the decades between the initial 
founding of the Internet to the development of highly sophisticated machines such as IBM’s 
DeepBlue that defeated the reigning world chess champion in 1997. Like the end of the 1990s 
and early 2000s, which was marked by concern over individual privacy rights spurred by the 
internet, present day concerns center around the regulation of automated decision-making and 
machine learning. Many civil society groups, politicians, government, technologists, and 
researchers, expressing concern over threats to democracy, have called for regulation of 
technologies that have greater agency in a world increasingly governed by algorithms. Even 
famed technologist Elon Musk said so at MIT’s 2014 AeroAstro Centennial Symposium: “I am 
increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the 
national and international level, just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish.” 
Other prominent public figures, Bill Gates and Stephen Hawking, have made strikingly similar 
statements. This is due to the unprecedented challenges of automated decision-making and its 
attendant threat to civil liberties and humans rights.  
Automated decision-making and machine learning algorithms have an ability to result in 
unfair bias if preventative measures are not taken such that a statistical overgeneralization is 
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made, training datasets are unrepresentative of a subset of the population, the implicit biases of 
the software developer are reflected in the dataset, the operator is susceptible to ‘automation’ 
bias, or even a simple error is made during the data input process (Luciano, et al., 2016). While 
discrimination in every circumstance is not necessarily ‘bad,’ the black box issue of machine 
learning makes it nearly impossible to know who to hold accountable when a claim of unfair 
discrimination does arise. This is because automated decision-making systems are diffuse. That 
is, the lines of accountability are increasingly blurred when it becomes difficult to identify 
whether it was the software developer who did not train the machine on characteristically diverse 
datasets, the judge placing an inordinate amount of faith in the decisional output, the failure of a 
state agency to use sound data collection methods, or any combination of the three. 
In response to these issues, several researchers (see Black and Murray, 2019) claim machine 
learning can be juxtaposed within existing Information Age regulatory frameworks, especially 
those concerning the internet. However, while there is considerable overlap, the underlying 
concerns guiding internet regulation differ in significant ways from those of the present day in 
regards to automated decision making. Indeed, the commercialization of the internet created the 
conditions by which these systems began to flourish. For example, the internet introduced 
efficiency and rapidity into how we communicate while also cheaply commoditizing personal 
information, laying the foundation for the development of machine learning. However, the 
shared principles, norms, and rules that shaped responses (or lack thereof) of internet regulation 
do not provide the framework needed to respond to the unique challenges of artificial 
intelligence. This is because the government’s regulatory strategy, in its approach to ADM, 
implicitly operates under the same neoliberalist principles that prioritizes innovation in ADM 
putting principles of transparency, accountability, fairness, and justice at risk.  
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This paper primarily focuses on the problems associated with unsupervised learning which 
refers to the ability of machines to quickly sort through and analyze massive amounts of data to 
find previously unknown patterns in behavior. Emerging patterns from these systems can be used 
to derive ‘actionable insights,’ perhaps the most valued form of data to an organization. To help 
elucidate ADM’s unique issues and situate them within a social science, I will offer an 
epistemological explanation of artificial intelligence and its subcomponents, automated decision-
making and machine learning. A brief overview of the technical process through which issues 
related to unfair outcomes arise will help readers better understand where biases might become 
embedded, and how developing specific checks or rules along the way could help prevent 
discriminatory outcomes. In doing so, I hope to move away from the traditional approach that 
has mainly focused on developing a set of ethical guidelines, or ‘soft’ laws, that guide automated 
decision-making and toward a different regulatory approach. I will argue as to why there are 
several issues with the how the government has approached problems with similar technologies 
such as the Internet and that ADM with its own unique set of challenges, cannot be regulated in 
the same manner.  
 
II. Artificial intelligence: Automated decision-making and machine learning 
Automated decision-making, machine learning, and predictive analysis are often used 
interchangeably in referring to a range of computerized tasks. Still, each differs in their 
operational function. This paper is primarily concerned with machine learning as a highly 
technical system, capable of performing a broad range of computerized tasks designed to 
replicate human neural networks, store and organize large quantities of information, detect 
patterns, and make predictions with increasing accuracy and reliability. A machine learning 
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algorithm commands a machine to perform a specific set of mathematically complex functions to 
generate a specified outcome (outputs) given a variety of factors (inputs). The inputs that a 
machine uses to derive insights refers to data that a business, government agency, or another 
entity collected either by purchasing it directly from a third-party vendor or entering into a 
contractual agreement with the user. This type of data can include names, ethnicity, race, and 
other fixed characteristics. A second criterion of data arguably generates the most controversy 
due to the method used for its collection and how it is used. Companies will embed cookies into 
web browsers and track users across webpages collecting data on the number of clicks or the 
time a user spends on a webpage. In addition to these two types of data, companies are known to 
collect geographical location data based on users’ IP addresses. The private sector’s ability to 
freely collect, use, and even disseminate users’ personal information has arguably been the 
central focus of the discussion over stricter regulation of the internet. I would now like to raise 
how automated decision-making further complicates this matter and why developing standards 
for ADM could help deal with shared concerns over these novel systems.  
A machine learning algorithm, trained upon a sufficiently large dataset, will build upon 
previous knowledge by interpolating data and generating novel patterns and insights that would 
otherwise be unidentifiable by a human (Van Otterlo, 2013). Individualized profiles, either based 
on factual data–as well as digitally created profiles, or inferred data–are constructed, inferences, 
made, and users are targeted with advertisements based on what they are likely to be interested 
in. However, uses of machine learning algorithms often go beyond advertising. Perhaps the most 
valued form of data, what are called “actionable insights,” can be generated whether they be for a 
CFO projecting future sales or a doctor evaluating the different outcomes for medical treatment 
decisions (IBM, 2018). These insights, or predictions, that the machine produced can either 
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augment or entirely replace humans in the decision-making process. For example, operating an 
aircraft today is largely dependent on knowing how to operate automated flight control systems 
(Schaper, 2019). Data is generated using negative feedback loops that tell the system if the plane 
is flying too high or low helping the pilot make adjustments as needed.  
This becomes problematic when the data that algorithms depend on are flawed because the 
algorithm has the ability to reconceptualize and reontologize the world in ways that may be 
undesirable (Luciano, et al., 2016). Still, even more disconcerting is that machine learning 
algorithms create a black box. As algorithmic models increase in mathematical complexity, 
difficulties in conceptualizing the logic of how a machine reached a certain conclusion arise. The 
machine, given a new set of data, can generate an algorithm that will autonomously define its 
own operational parameters, or engage in what is called ‘unsupervised learning’ (Luciano, et al., 
2016). The machine generates a classification model for determining how new inputs will be 
grouped to enable it to make generalizations that go beyond the training data. The matter is 
complicated by the fact that it is assumed that the operator does not need to understand the 
rationale behind the development of decision-making rules (Matthias, 2004: 179). The machine 
is capable of generating algorithms that are sometimes hundreds or even thousands of lines long 
making it nearly impossible for computer engineers to understand. Even though there is 
sufficiently large gap between the design and operation of algorithms in complex machine 
learning techniques, the problem mainly lies with unrepresentative, outdated, or incomplete data, 
statistical generalizations, and automation bias. (Luciano, et al., 2016).  
Research by Hildebrandt (2013) into machine learning methods where humans assisted in 
decision-making, found that statistical inferences, or generalizations, based on group 
characteristics and large datasets has had sufficient use in the application of machine learning 
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outputs. Spurious correlations in proprietary algorithms where the data indicates causation even 
where the real-world circumstances might indicate otherwise has, in some instances, been 
enough to act upon the evidence produced by the algorithm (Luciano et al., 2016). This could be 
indicative of several issues: inadequate training for the operator on the technicalities of these 
systems such that they can perpetuate or worsen inequalities such that a machine that is trained 
on an insufficient number of characteristics will have a difficult time recognizing data that 
deviates from the dataset it was initially trained on. For example, if Black people are more likely 
to be arrested for a crime because of historical prejudices and racist policing practices this is 
likely to be reflected in the machine’s output (Angwin, et al., 2016). In this instance, the machine 
would infer that Black people would be more likely to commit a future crime and it is at the 
discretion of the operator to determine whether the decision is applicable to the person in 
question.  
If the algorithm is not trained on datasets that are representative of the population this could 
also be a direct result of the software developer incorporating either intentional or unintentional 
biases into the dataset. For instance, if a Hispanic male software developer only sees the value in 
training the algorithm on datasets that are representative of the Hispanic population or males then 
that becomes problematic when the algorithm is used to make decisions regarding Asian women. 
However, even improper data collection could lead to an error in the data input process if the 
analyst responsible for ‘cleaning’ the data makes a simple error. These are examples meant to 
demonstrate that algorithmic decision-making is fallible to human error at nearly every stage and 
that a regulatory body composed of experts to monitor the use of machine learning models are 
imperative to act ex ante and prevent abuses before they arise.  
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III. Normative concerns and current policy issues 
Technology has an integral role in organizing societies, and, like most things revolutionizing 
production processes, there are likely to be widespread concomitant societal implications. Aside 
from those wrought by the internet, the turn of the century was marked by a cascade of literature 
on issues created by automated decision-making. In The ethics of algorithms: Mapping the 
debate, a useful taxonomy was developed to help identify three normative concerns that arise 
due to the technical shortcomings of ADM: traceability, unfair outcomes, and transformative 
effects (Luciano, et al., 2016). In their research, the authors concluded that there is significant 
consensus concerning automated decision-making as a socio-technical system. That is, the 
values, ethics, and moral concerns that (though oft disagreed upon) provide the context under 
which these systems technically operate implicate normative and epistemic questions about their 
ability to aid in achieving societal goals (Luciano, et al., 2016). Realizing the unique challenges 
that automated decision-making raises, efforts to develop a set of soft laws from normative 
concerns such as these have matured in recent years, but the literature does not offer much 
beyond that. Given that bias in automated decision-making has been major point of discussion 
amongst civil society groups, researchers, regulators, and even technologists, suggesting that 
there is considerable interest in greater regulatory oversight, an approach that focuses more 
heavily on applied, data-driven techniques and that does not simply deal in abstraction is 
necessary in working toward a more salient regulatory framework. 
This is not meant to discount concerted efforts made by researchers to translate the technical 
shortcomings of ADM to broader philosophical precepts; a philosophy is entirely necessary to 
developing a regulatory framework that transitions away from how the Internet Age technologies 
have been regulated to a new set of guidelines tailored to the specific challenges of ADM. I am 
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simply making a broad assertion in saying that many published works (not to the exclusion of 
legal scholarship) stress the importance that ADM systems are not infallible to human error and, 
as indicated by Luciano, et. al’s research, themes and patterns within the literature are entirely 
cognoscible. Therefore, greater strides toward a regulatory agenda that builds on this qualitative 
research should be the next natural progression in the regulatory agenda. This is also not to say 
the conversation surrounding ADM should cease altogether, but occur simultaneously to greater 
discussions aiming toward the realization of a set of actionable governmental goals and 
objectives and the mechanisms available in helping to realize those goals. However, before 
discussing possible regulatory approaches the government might take to regulate greater use of 
ADM, I must first discuss problems with the current literature.  
More and more, automated decision-making has raised specific concerns not only related to 
criminal justice but a variety of cross-sector issues such as antitrust and fair business practices, 
physical safety, personal and societal relationships, economic and social inequality, and more 
(Edwards and Veale, 2017). Upon recognizing the need for more stringent guidelines, several 
proposals have been made that situate automated decision-making within broader regulatory 
frameworks for the internet. However, there are several reasons why the current approach to 
regulation is insufficient in dealing with the unique issues that automated decision-making 
systems raise. One, the internet is regulated using a principles-based approach that prescribes 
principles or guidelines while leaving implementation to individual firms. Principles-based rules 
introduce ambiguity and subjectivity into the moral or ethical values and are typically used to 
define behavioral objectives. Typically, principles-based approaches require that ‘regulatees’ 
assume greater responsibility (Decker, 2018). For example, Facebook’s “Supreme Court,” an 
innovation of CEO Mark Zuckerberg, is a way for users to appeal decisions concerning the ban 
 14 
of hateful speech on the company’s platform (Kang, 2021). This might be unproblematic if the 
companies that largely develop and control these systems were not currently facing numerous 
allegations of human rights violations (Google has previously come under fire for its 
mishandling of sexual harassment claims and for its firing of four employees that were active in 
labor organizing [Conger and Wakabayaski, 2019]). Moreover, companies could report 
compliance with standards and guidelines while not actually following them. In other words, 
there is no enforcement or procedures in place, such as the government conducting an internal 
audit, to ensure companies follow set guidelines. Where there are no enforcement mechanisms, 
problems of companies producing falsified reports can (and do) arise. In 2015, the EPA found 
that Volkswagen had been cheating emissions tests making it appear that diesel cars were 
emitting far less pollution than they actually were (Clarke, et al., 2015). 
Secondly, softer, principles-based forms of law are insufficient on their own for the issues 
that automated decision-making systems raise because they are slow to adapt to rapidly changing 
circumstances. There is a growing gap between technological advancement in machine learning 
(or artificial intelligence more broadly) and, considering partisan gridlock makes it notoriously 
difficult to pass legislation, laws that reflect changes in attitudes are slow to change. 
Additionally, it could also be argued that the sector-specific, principles-based approach to 
internet regulation such as privacy law have largely failed considering that privacy policies are 
often long and convoluted and users often do not have a choice in which information they choose 
to disclose without abdicating their rights to freely navigate the internet (Brownlie, 2020). 
Additionally, computer software is protected by software licensing laws (any software shipped 
by a company or programmers prohibits the copying or sharing of that software) and proprietary 
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software that was developed in-house introduces issues of accountability that make it hard for 
judges to determine who should be responsible when a claim arises.  
  Still, I must stress that crafting technical standards for automated decision-making and 
machine learning has proven exceedingly difficult since the problems of regulating automated 
decision-making come from balancing the promotion of market-based innovation with 
regulations on the use and application of these systems. Likewise, regulating automated decision-
making with a one-size-fits-all approach has been particularly challenging considering automated 
decision-making operates in different scales, different contexts, and with different abilities 
(Scherer, 2016). Perhaps then not surprising, there is inherent difficultly in deriving a shared 
conceptual understanding of these systems and, as a result, strategies for regulating automated 
decision-making have been piecemeal. For example, the Food and Drug Administration, in 
taking a risk-based approach to regulating new software as medical devices, has established its 
own approval process that technologies intending to treat, diagnose, cure, mitigate, or prevent 
disease must undergo before they are widely distributed (“Proposed Regulatory Framework for 
Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning Based Software as a Medical Device,” 
2019). However, because the physical threat to safety that software as medical devices pose 
makes them easier to regulate, automated decision-making is more complex where bias and 
discrimination cannot be easily proven given a black box. While an array of regulatory tools are 
available at the government’s discretion, the United States government has approached 
regulation over the last several decades using two dominant approaches: rules-based approach 
and principles-based approaches. That being said, I believe a hybrid regulatory approach that is 
more heavily based prescribing rules with additional emphasis given to outlining principles for 
the regulation of ADM technologies would be best given the unique issues of ADM and machine 
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learning techniques. This is because traditional principles-based approaches are insufficient on 
their own given the technical shortcomings and newfangled ethical concerns of ADM systems. 
Additionally, strict ‘command-and-control’ approaches, as I will soon show, have their own 
drawbacks as well.  
This paper has proceeded thus far by heavily emphasizing why automated decision-support 
systems require government intervention and less on how the government can fulfill its duty of 
protecting societal well-being from the harms and abuses of these systems. Based on a thorough 
assessment of the peer-reviewed articles, media publications, government reports, books, and 
podcasts, missing is a cross-literature bibliometric analysis that identifies the various approaches 
the United States government might take in realizing its goals provided a synthesis of available 
regulatory tools. Seeing that regulation does not just exist in the abstract, but as a set of 
actionable policy goals, the next step should be working toward a regulatory approach. 
 
IV. Toward a Greater Regulatory Framework  
Scholarship and the media alike tend to use the term ‘regulation’ to intuitively refer to 
government intervention in liberty and choices through an administrative body adopting legal 
rules or promulgations. At this point, it becomes necessary to define what is meant by regulation. 
The definitive legal dictionary, Black Law’s Dictionary, defines regulation as ‘the act of 
regulating; a rule or order prescribed for management or government; a regulating principle.’ 
Equally alike, the Oxford English Dictionary defines regulation as ‘the action or fact of 
regulating.’ If we assume that the goal of regulation is to intervene where the market fails and 
that the overall governmental objective is to protect societal well-being, then, in fulfilling its 
obligation, a definition of regulation must include the tools and instruments available to realize 
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this goal. Therein, the overarching governmental objective for the purpose of a regulatory 
scheme is as follows: ‘Curtailing the threat that profiling places on individuals and groups based 
on machine-generated insights including data collected on prior and present behavior, personal 
and professional interests, geographic location, and social determinants such as race, gender, 
ethnicity, age, and disability.’ Executive Order 12866, which requires federal agencies to engage 
in a cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations, more narrowly defines regulation as ‘an 
agency statement of general applicability and future effect, which the agency intends to have an 
effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe 
the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.’ It is the definition that this paper relies on.  
Despite current challenges, multiple national and international governing agencies have set 
forth frameworks for the development of guidelines, principles, and standards for the many uses 
of ADM systems given underlying ethical concerns. For example, in 2019, Singapore released its 
Model AI Governance Framework which focuses on articulating a set internal governance 
structures and measures, human involvement in AI-augmented decision-making, operations 
management and stakeholder interaction and communication (“Model Artificial Intelligence 
Governance Framework,” 2019). Seeing as the problems of automated decision-making require 
both technical competence and principled decision-making, an executive agency whose primary 
purpose is to regulate automated decision-making, and artificial intelligence more broadly, is 
integral to the development of regulatory schemas. Agencies have a distinct advantage over 
legislatures and judges in policymaking for several reasons. For one, agency policymakers tend 
to be experts in the relevant field rather than broad generalists like judges or legislators (Scherer, 
2016). Two, agencies have the ability to quickly respond to any changes in the technology 
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landscape since they are not stymied by the political process. And, third, administrative agencies 
can act ex ante whereas judges enact laws ex post (Scherer, 2016).  
 
i. Risk-based assessment and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
To determine the benefits and drawbacks of the potential risks of automated decision-making 
and machine learning techniques, a risk-based assessment is necessary. Risk-based assessments 
are well-established in areas of public health and safety, toxicology, environmental regulation, 
defense, and novel technologies (Scott, et al., 1999). Mathematical techniques analyze the 
probabilities and potentially harmful effects of an activity making this approach increasingly 
attractive. Empirically driven by scientific research, risk-based approaches provide decision-
makers with probabilities, hazards, and assessments over a particular area concerning society, the 
environment, economy, government, or industry. These are subjective issues that require the 
insight of technical experts such as statisticians, data scientists in addition to social scientists, 
legal scholars, and others. An administrative agency composed of technical expertise would 
typically develop a risk matrix.  
Executive Order 12866, passed by the Clinton Administration, requires that a cost-benefit 
analysis be prepared for any ‘significant’ proposed regulation by executive agencies (Sunstein, 
2015). These includes costs and benefits to industry, government, individuals, communities, the 
environment, and the economy. Following a risk-based assessment, I believe a cost-benefit 
analysis that could include determining the net benefits, harms, and benefits of a specific policy 
proposal is the successive step in a regulatory proposal. For example, the cost of training tools 
and materials for the use of automated decision-making systems could be determined using a 
cost-benefit analysis. Still, many factors could go into a cost-benefit analysis making it hard to 
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determine the relevant information. For example, how could the social costs of altogether 
banning artificial intelligence be monetized? Given that the problems of regulation stem from a 
diffuse technology, regulating automation as a decision-support system must be done through a 
multi-sector approach in higher education, employment screening, financial services, and 
healthcare. Therefore, shared consensus amongst technical experts is required further lending 
credibility to the idea of an executive agency.  
 
 
i. Rules-based approach 
Traditional ‘command-and-control,’ rules-based approaches are highly prescriptive. They 
include explicit rules on what can and cannot be done. For example, a ‘right to an explanation’ 
forms the basis of the EU’s General Data Privacy Rights (GDPR) principles on privacy rights 
and data usage. A compelling solution to make automated systems more transparent, 
explainability requires that a logical explanation is provided where the intentions behind the 
modeling process, summary statistics and descriptions of the input data used to train the model, 
information on the model’s predictive skill, how inputs are turned into outputs, and how the 
model was tested, trained, or screened for undesirable properties are made available by request 
(Edwards and Veale, 2017). Explainability stems from concerns over autonomy in greater 
individual discretion over what type of information is disclosed to private companies. 
Approaches such as these require that the regulator take responsibility to develop and enforce 
rules. Say the government wants to focus on preventing unfair outcomes then it could develop a 
process for showing that a product, service, or system meets the requirements of a technical 
standard. Such rules that regulators might formulate might require that machine learning 
algorithms are trained on a specific number of datasets before being approved for use.  
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However, as argued in Slave to the Algorithm? Why A ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is Probably 
Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, explainability only goes so far (Edwards and Veale, 
2017). For one, meaningful explanations do not work well for every task, and, secondly, 
explanations fall short where outliers in the dataset cannot be easily interpreted. Looking at the 
broader intent behind explainability, even by requiring explainability under privacy law, it is not 
enough for dealing with the larger issues related to the discussion above for two reasons. One, 
even without information on personal characteristics such as race, or class, machine learning 
algorithms (as discussed above) draw statistical inferences based on data inputs. Additionally, 
transparency in the form of explainability only goes so far as the subject is aware that a machine 
learning algorithm was used to assist in making a decision. Machine learning is used in many 
contexts that is largely unknown to the user such as in application screenings where the user does 
not have the option to contest the decision. Therefore, a rules-based approach to regulation might 
need to be complemented by a principles-based approach that requires employers to disclose if 
they have used an algorithm for hiring decisions based on avoiding an outcome. Still, applying 
one approach over another should be based on a critical assessment of the specific context of 
regulation. Further research might include an empirical study assessing public opinion on the 
perceived risks and harms these technologies pose.   
 
Figure 1.1: Cost-benefit analysis of differing regulatory strategies in the context of automated 
decision-making and machine learning 
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Ensures regulatees are 
accountable 
 
Hybrid-approach Can ‘soften the edges’ 
associated with each approach 
 
Combines positive attributes of 
each approach 
 
Allows regulates flexibility 
and innovation in compliance  
 
Allows regulates to better 
appreciate and understand the 
general regulatory goals that 
are being pursued in a specific 
area 
 
Regulatory strategy could 
compound the negative 
attributes of each approach–
with neither approaches being 
efficient nor optimal  
 
May not fully reap benefits of 
each approach 
Decker, Christopher, (2018). Goals-based and Rules-based Approaches to Regulation. BEIS Research Paper Number 8, 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717739 
 
V. Conclusion 
Automated decision-making raises specific concerns where the internet does not since the 
way data is generated, collected, and used has profound implications for what information is 
valued and what is knowable. With various social actors with competing interests shaping the 
way data is used and on what terms, private companies are capable of guiding societal behavior 
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as new patterns in individual behavior, but also institutions, governments, and other entities, 
emerge. The primary function of this paper is to help researchers operationalize concepts in the 
literature so far as they are qualitatively focused. I begin with a broad overview of the technical 
difficulties associated with automated decision-making and machine learning algorithms as they 
have the potential to exacerbate inequalities in unprecedented ways. Given that widespread 
concern over these specific issues has been the central focus of the discussion, I argue that 
researchers have successfully translated these issues into overarching normative concerns 
arguing that there is a need for some form of regulation that could guide policy objectives set 
forth by an executive agency. The governmental objective that I propose, given the ethical 
concerns of these systems, is as follows: ‘Curtailing the threat that profiling places on individuals 
and groups based on machine-generated insights including data collected on prior and present 
behavior, personal and professional interests, geographic location, and social determinants such 
as race, gender, ethnicity, age, and disability.’ I then proceed by arguing that gaps in the 
literature exist in identifying specific mechanisms and tools to use in realizing these greater 
policy objectives. The successive step in strengthening regulatory schemas around automated 
decision-making comes in deciding how to regulate. A conceptual framework could help 
industry leaders, researchers and scientists, policymakers, committed to ensuring the protection 
of human rights and civil liberties, take actionable steps to prevent harms and abuses by these 
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